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THE DEFENSE OF "PASSING ON" IN TREBLE DAMAGE
SUITS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS*
IN private antitrust actions to recoup excessive prices charged by the de-
fendant, the requirement that plaintiff have been "injured in his business or
property"' may be rendered nugatory if recovery is granted where plaintiff
has "passed on" the overcharges to customers. Section 4 of the Clayton Act
permits any person injured "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws" to bring a civil action for "threefold the damages by him sustained."
'2
The preponderance of private antitrust litigation is brought subsequent to a
successful government action against the defendant, 3 since the judgment or
decree obtained by the government, admissible as prima facie evidence of the
requisite antitrust violation,4 eliminates the usually prohibitive burden of prov-
ing the violation independently.5 The crucial issues in a treble damage action,
therefore, are usually reduced to establishing that the prior violation has caused
an injury to the plaintiff and proving the amount of damages sustained as a
*The Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade
Cas.) ff 69614 (M.D. Pa., Feb. 12, 1960), aff'd per curiam, TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade
Cas.) 11 69754 (3d Cir., June 30, 1960), cert. denied, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3154 (Nov. 15,
1960).
1. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the dam-
ages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). This section supersedes
Sherman Act § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), which was repealed by the Act of July 7, 1955, 69
Stat. 283.
2. Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
3. See Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 1, 6-7 (1959) ; Comment, 61 YA.LE L.J. 1010, 1060 (1952).
4. Clayton Act § 5, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958). Section
5 does not apply, however, to "consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony
has been taken" or to a judgment or decree in a civil action brought by the government-
under 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1958). Prior consent decrees "may nonetheless come in through
the back door of judicial notice." Bicks, supra note 3, at 7. Section 5 additionally tolls the
statute of limitations as to any private right of action during the pendency of government
litigation and for one year thereafter.
Without this provision, prior judgments would have no evidentiary value to private
litigants. See Buckeye Powder Co. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55,
63 (1918). For a discussion of the damaging potential of section 5 on a defendant's case,
see Seely, The Pitfalls Which Lurk in Government Litigation for Defendants Who May
be Subjected to Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 17 (1959). For a discussion
of the practical limitations of section 4, see Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1040-41 (1952).
5. See McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64
HARV. L. REv. 27 (1950). See generally Art' GEN. NAT'I Comm. ANTITRUST RFv. 349
(1955).
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result of the injury.- Where the action involves illegal overcharges exacted by
the defendant, and plaintiff is a "middleman"--one who either resells the item
or uses it in the manufacture of another product-the defendant may attempt
to prove that plaintiff has recouped the total overcharge by raising the price
to his customers, and has, consequently, not been injured. 7 Alternatively, the
defendant may argue that damages should be reduced to the extent that plain-
tiff's customers have absorbed the overcharge.8 This "passing on" defense has
been recognized as valid in several contexts.
In the Oil Jobber cases, decided by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits in the
1940's, plaintiffs subjected to overcharges were unable to demonstrate that
they had sustained damages.9 The defendant in each case was a member of a
group which had been convicted of conspiracy to raise the spot-market price
of gasoline in the Midwest.' Plaintiffs were jobber-distributors who pur-
chased gasoline from members of the conspiracy and resold it to service sta-
tions. Their resale price was set by the defendants, according to a formula
which added a fixed profit margin to whatever price plaintiffs had been charged
for the gasoline." The jobbers sought to recover threefold the amount of the
overcharge. Recovery was uniformly denied. The naked overcharge was in-
sufficient to support a finding of damages because plaintiffs had passed on
the overcharge to their customers under the fixed-margin formula. 12 One court
6. See Seely, supra note 4, at 18; LOEVINGER, THE LAW OF FREE ENTERPRISE 264
(1949).
7. See Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 429, 433-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 915 (1955) (affirming decree dismissing action) ; Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for defendants) ; Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369,
370-71 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942) (granting defendants'
motion for partial summary judgment).
8. See Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 969 (7th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944) ; Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d
747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941) ; Banana Distribs. v. United Fruit Co.,
162 F. Supp. 32, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ; cf. Farrey's, Inc. v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co.,
103 F. Supp. 488, 490-91 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
.9. Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.),- cert. denied,'326
U.S.-734 (1945); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42-F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Wis.),
appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944) ; Twin Ports Oil
Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert- denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941).
10. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S, 150 (1940).
IL. See, e.g., Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil-Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.- 1941). In
fact, th _7formula-was computed with the retail-price as the starting point. hbid-. - ..
12.. Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,. 148 F.2d 580, 58Z (8th Cir.),' cert. denied,
326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967,
971 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944) ("plaintiff has wholly failed to prove
any loss . . . but rather . . . the increased cost . . . was passed on to the ultimate con-
sumer") ; Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 744 (1941) ; Leonard v, Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42- F. Supp. 369, 371 (W.D.
Wis.), appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942) ("if the increase in price to plaintiff'
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said, "Plaintiffs are seeking not compensation for damages suffered by de-
fendants' illegal acts, but profits because of said acts."
The Ninth Circuit, in a direct holding,' 4 and the Fourth Circuit in dictum,'"
have cited the Oil Jobber cases with approval in sustaining the "passing on"
defense. In the Ninth Circuit case, plaintiff alleged that defendant had restricted
the supply of ingredients necessary to plaintiff's paint manufacturing business,
and that damage had been sustained because plaintiff had been forced to pur-
chase a more expensive substitute. Plaintiffs' profits during the years of the
alleged antitrust violation, however, had been greater than those made in the
free market which followed; the court, therefore, required proof that the in-
creased cost had been absorbed by plaintiff and not passed on to its custom-
ers.10 Failing this, plaintiff was denied recovery. The "passing on" issue was
not decisive in the Fourth Circuit decision because plaintiffs had failed to
show a violation of the antitrust laws. Yet the court stated in dictum that "any
increases in the price of defendant's product were passed on ... to the ultimate
consumer; and under the settled decisions, plaintiff has suffered no injury for
which the law will permit him treble damages.'
17
Proof that the plaintiff has actually sustained damages has been held irrele-
vant in one analogous class of cases-those brought under the Interstate Com-
merce Act to enforce an ICC reparation order compelling the carrier to re-
fund freight charges in excess of Commission-established rates.' 8 A carrier
may not avoid the reparation order by showing that the plaintiff-shipper suc-
ceeded in passing on the excess freight charge to others.19 The ICC reparation
order, however, serves a regulatory rather than a compensatory function. It
is designed to maintain uniformity among the rates set by the ICC. Courts,
recognizing that the reparation order does not always compensate the party
ultimately damaged, 20 have awarded relief on the premise that carriers ought
not be allowed to retain more than the Commission-established rates pro-
vide.21 Multiple recoveries against the carrier are avoided by the rule that the
action to recover an overcharge may be brought only by the party who paid
was passed on by him to his customers, he has suffered no pecuniary loss or injury to his
business or property").
13. Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra note 12, at 582.
14. Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F2d 427 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915
(1955).
15. Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1958).
16. Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 432 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
915 (1955).
17. Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1958).
18. See 24 Stat. 382 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1958).
19. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918);
cf. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Sloss-Sheffield Iron & Steel Co, 269 U.S. 217, 235-36 (1925)
(Brandeis, J.) ; Adams v. Mills, 286 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J.).
20. See Adams v. Mills, 286 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1932) ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-
Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 534 (1918).
21. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., supra note 20; Burgess
v. Transcontinental Freight Bureau, 13 I.C.C. 668, 680 (1908),
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the excess charges?2 Although recovery may be a windfall to the shipper, the
difficulty of searching out the persons (probably consumers) who ultimately
bear the overcharge makes it impossible to divest the carrier of the overcharge
by any other means.23 The distinctive nature of the reparation order becomes
apparent when it is compared to the shipper's action against a common carrier
for giving illegal rebates to other shippers.2 4 In this kind of case, the Supreme
Court has reasoned that to measure damages simply by the amount of the re-
bates "would create a legalized, but endless, chain of departures from the tariff
... [and] would destroy the equality and certainty of rates. .. " The ship-
per must prove actual monetary loss in order to recover.
2 0
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.2 7 is the first case to reject
the "passing on" defense in a private antitrust suit. United Shoe Machinery
Corporation had been convicted of violating the Sherman Act in 1953.28 Han-
over Shoe, Inc., brought a treble damage action, based upon that judgment,
for injury alleged to have resulted from excessive rental and royalty charges
for shoe machinery. A separate trial was held to determine whether Hanover
had been "injured" within the meaning of section 4.29 It was assumed for pur-
poses of the separate trial that the violation of law and the overcharge each
existed as alleged. Hanover claimed that it suffered injury at the moment of
overcharge; defendant contended that plaintiff had not been injured because
all excess costs had been passed on to plaintiff's customers.
The payment of the overcharge was held by the district court to constitute
the requisite "actual harm" to plaintiff, and passing on was ruled "invalid" as
a defense. In the court's view, "the plaintiff's injury occurred when it was
charged too much for the machinery," because, absent the overcharge, there
would have been more money in the corporate treasury available for dividends
or expansion.30 Relying on general tort doctrine, the court explained that sub-
sequent developments which "let an injured plaintiff escape some of the ulti-
mate consequences of the wrong done him do not inure to the benefit of the
22. Baker Mfg. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 21 I.C.C. 605, 607 (1911) ; Nicola, Stone
& Myers Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 14 I.C.C. 199, 207-09 (1908). If consignee, as agent
for consignor, physically pays the freight, consignor retains right to reparation. Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Sloss-Sheffield Iron & Steel Co., 269 U.S. 217, 238 (1925).
23. See, e.g., Burgess v. Transcontinental Freight Bureau, supra note 21, at 680.
24. See 24 Stat. 382 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1958).
25. Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 206 (1913).
26. See Davis v. Portland Seed Co., 264 U.S. 403, 415, 417, 425 (1924) ; ICC v. United
States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 390 (1933).
27. TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) ff 69614 (M.D. Pa., Feb. 12, 1960), aff'd per
curiam, TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) ff 69754 (3d Cir., June 30, 1960), cert. denied,
29 U.S.L. WEEK 3154 (Nov. 15, 1960). The district court opinion is hereinafter cited as
"Hanover opinion."
28. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
29. Hanover opinion at 76475; see FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
0. Hanover opinion at 76476.
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defendant."'31 The district court's conclusion also rested on Southern Pac. Co.
v. Darnell-Taenz-er Lumber Co.,32 an ICC rate reparation case in which the
Supreme Court held that damages are measured at the moment of overcharge,
without regard to subsequent developments. The court distinguished the Oil
Jobber cases by creating what may become known as the "original package"
doctrine of the antitrust laws: the plaintiffs in the Oil Jobber cases ,vere mid-
dlemen reselling "a product supplied for resale by a Sherman Act violator
whereas plaintiff here is simply a lessee ,of equipment which sells its own
product. '33 The lessee of equipment, the court reasoned, was therefore a "con-
sumer." This distinction seems to restrict the district court's earlier statement
that events subsequent to the overcharge are irrelevant to the question of in-
jury; such events may be relevant if the plaintiff fits the court's idea of a
"middleman."
An interlocutory appeal was permitted, since the question was one which
involved "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion."34 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed in a per curiam opinion which found the district court's opinion
"thoroughly convincing" in its rejection of the defense.3 5 Defendant's claim
that allowance of a recovery would result in a windfall to plaintiff was rejected
as inconsistent with the overriding congressional policy to impose treble dam-
ages as a penalty to deter monopolistic practices.
The district court's conclusion would have been supported by general tort
doctrine if the court, in finding that plaintiff had been "injured," had meant
to distinguish between "injury" as the violation of a statutory right sufficient
to support a claim for relief, and "injury" as the damage caused by that viola-
tion. Common law tort doctrine recognizes this distinction.' 6 It considers in-
juria sine damno to be actionable, because the law presumes that damages flow
from the violation of a right.37 Applying this distinction in the Hanover case,
the district court might have limited its holding to the conclusion that the
overcharge was actionable as a violation of plaintiff's rights, postponing until
31. Ibid.
32. 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
33. Hanover opinion at 76477-78. The district court distinguished the Ninth Circuit
case, Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915
(1955), as dictum because ". . . there was no showing that the manufacturer paid any
more for the raw material than he would have in a competitive market . . . ." Hanover
opinion at 76478 n.12. This is not accurate; the Wolfe opinion, supra at 432, finds an over-
charge: "[L]ithopone ... cost considerably more; and it appears that ... plaintiffs paid
$18,400 more for it ... than they would have spent for a comparable quantity of titanium
pigment."
34. Hanover opinion at 76478.
35. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade
Cas.) 11 69754 (3d Cir., June 30, 1960).
36. See CooLEY, TORTs 74 (2d ed. 1888); HALE, DAMAGES 16 (1896).
37. See Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 29 Fed. Cas. 506 (No. 17322) (C.C.D. Me. 1838)
(Story, J.) ; Wipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co., 29 Fed. Cas. 934 (No. 17516) (C.C.D. Me.
1843).
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trial the question whether plaintiff actually had been damaged by the over-
charge. The common law distinction between "injury" and "damage," how-
ever, is not applicable to the treble damage action. Section 4 allows a private
party to sue if he has been "injured in his business or property," and courts
have construed this provision to require that plaintiff offer evidence of pecu-
niary loss as a prerequisite to maintaining the action.38 The district court it-
self seemed to recognize this requirement; its decision to uphold the complaint
is based on a finding that plaintiff had suffered recoverable damages. Principal
reliance was placed on language in the Darnell-Taenzer case indicating that
the law does not go beyond the instant of overcharge in computing damages.,3
Also, the court clearly states that the plaintiff is entitled to "recover" the ex-
cessive charges, regardless of passing on.40 Thus, while the court did not
actually compute the damages in this action, its holding is dispositive on the
damage question to the extent that consideration of "passing on" is precluded
in the calculation of damages. The ultimate incidence of the overcharge will
be irrelevant.
The court's extension of common law tort doctrine to support a finding
of actual damages is inaccurate. Although injuria sine dano is actionable,
the amount of recovery will be nominal absent proof of actual pecuniary loss. 41
The Darnell-Taenzer case, cited in support of the district court's damage
theory, was an action to enforce an ICC reparation order and not an action for
treble damages under the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court recognized this
distinction in Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.42 There, a conspiracy in restraint
of trade had raised freight rates on plaintiff's product. Plaintiff filed a com-
plaint with the ICC, which approved the allegedly unreasonable rates after
holding extensive hearings. Having no grounds upon which to seek a repara-
tion order, plaintiff brought an action for treble damages under the antitrust
laws. The Court denied recovery on the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove
that .the unreasonably high rates had resulted in actual loss to him. Justice
Brandeis distinguished the action from one for enforcement of a reparation
order:
38. See, e.g., Keogh v. Chicago & N.. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1922) (quoted
infra at note 43). In antitrust cases the statute of limitations begins to run when damages
occur. Bluefields S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 Fed. 1, 20 (3d Cir. 1917). See also
cases cited notes 7 & 8 supra.
39. Hanover opinion at 76477.
40. Id. at 76478.
41. See, e.g., Little v. Stanback, 63 N.C. 285, 287 (1869) ; Bagby v. Harris, 9 Ala.
173, 177 (1846). The early case of Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta,
203 U.S. 390 (1906), cited by the Hanover court, Hanover opinion at 76477, does not
compel alteration of this principle. That case contains language which might be read as
limiting the inquiry in" a treble damage action to the moment of overcharge. See 203 U.S.
at 399. The Court, however, never faced that issue; it was concerned only with which of
three state statutes of limitations was applicable. See id. at 397. The Court's refusal to go
beyond the "first step" therefore goes only to the focal point for determining the nature
of the cause of action.
4?. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
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[U]nder § 7 of the antitrust act, as under § 8 of the Act to Regulate
Commerce... recovery cannot be had unless it be shown, that ... dam-
ages in some amount susceptible of expression in figures resulted. These
damages must be proved by facts from which their existence is logically
and legally inferable .... It is not like those cases where a shipper re-
covers from the carrier the amount by which its exaction exceeded the
legal rate. Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Co.
43
Whatever the force of Darnell-Taenzer as authority for measuring damages
at the instant of overcharge, the Supreme Court has clearly limited its appli-
cation to ICC reparation order cases, and has explicitly rejected it as authority
in a treble damage action.
The district court's statement that events after the moment of overcharge
are irrelevant to the damages issue fails to discriminate between general prin-
ciples of damage computation in cases of personal injury and those applicable
to recovery for pecuniary harm.44 The authorities cited by the court 45 do not
support its conclusions in the latter context. The Restatement of Torts is direct-
ly contradictory:
In determining the measure of recovery, aside from harm to body,
emotions or reputation, a balance sheet is in effect set up by the court in
which are stated the items of assets and liabilities which have been affected
by the tort (a) before the tort and (b) as they appear at the time of
trial. . . . The difference to the extent that it results from the tort con-
stitutes the theoretical measure of recovery .... Tortfeasor is liable only
for the amount of the net harm which he has caused .... 46
Those sections of McCormick, Damages, cited by the court merely state the
author's preference, under admittedly conflicting authority, for, (1) the rule
which denies the tortfeasor the benefit of gratuitous payments made to the
plaintiff by third parties or under an indemnity contract, and (2) the rule that
an injured employee may recover the value of lost wages even though his em-
ployer gratuitously continues his wage payments. 47 These rules seem inappli-
cable to the situation before the court; Hanover bears no relation to an action
to recover lost wages, nor is it reasonable to categorize the higher payments
made by Hanover's customers, which enabled it to pass on the overcharge, as
"gratuitous" or made under an indemnity contract. If McCormick is appli-
cable at all, the higher customer payments would seem to fall within his gen-
43. Id. at 164-65.
44. See LOEVINGER, op. cit. sitpra note 6, at 264.
45. Hanover opinion at 76477 n.5 (citing McCORMIcK, DAMAGES § 90, at 324 (1935)
and RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 920, comment e (1939)), n.6 (citing MCCORMICK, supra and
RESTATEMENT, supra at § 924, comment f), n.7 (citing McCoRMIcK, supra, § 87, at 310
and RESTATEMENT, supra at § 920, comment e).
46. RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 906, comment a (1939) ; accord, Merchant Shippers Ass'n
v. Kellogg Express & Draying Co., 28 Cal. 2d 594, 170 P.2d 923 (1946) ; Douglas v. Pres-
cott, 31 Ga. App. 684, 121 S.E. 689 (1924) ; Enterprise Garnetting Co. v. Forcier, 69 RI.
455, 35 A.2d 1 (1943).
47. McCopicyc DAMAGES §§ 87, 90 & n.12 (1935).
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eral category of benefits which reduce damages because they have been made
possible by defendant's conduct ;48 the increases in the price of shoes was pos-
sible only because United Shoe had monopolized the entire shoe machinery
industry and had thus established equally excessive costs for all competing
producers. Moreover, the Hanover court itself failed to adhere to its "instant-
of-overcharge" theory. Looking to the net effect on plaintiff's "total wealth,"
the court said:
If . . . [plaintiff] had not thus been illegally charged for machinery it
would have had more money to pay out in dividends, or to engage in a
further development campaign to sell its shoes, or to raise the wages of
its employees, or to enlarge its bank account as protection against a rainy
day, or for all these things.
49
In looking to the ultimate effect on Hanover's financial position, the court was
properly applying general damage doctrine. But it was unjustified in offering
this conclusion as a reason for rejecting the validity of the passing-on defense;
plaintiff's supply of working capital would not have been imp'aired unless plain-
tiff had actually absorbed the excess cost.50
Finally, the court was satisfied that Hanover's position as lessee sufficiently
distinguished it from the "middlemen" in the Oil Jobber cases. Perhaps this
distinction was prompted by evidentiary considerations. "Passing on" is no
doubt easier to visualize and to prove when the overcharge is attached to an
identifiable item which is itself resold at a correspondingly higher price. But
the distinction has no economic significance. Both the middleman and the
lessee-manufacturer are charged excessive prices. Both recover the overcharge
by raising the price of the commodity they sell.r" It is thus irrelevant whether
the plaintiff resells the excessive-cost-item or uses it to manufacture a different
product. In practical effect, Hanover is directly inconsistent with, and indis-
tinguishable from, the Oil Jobber cases.
The inadequacies of the district court's opinion, however, do not compel the
conclusion that passing on ought to be permitted as a defense. As the Third
Circuit's per curiam affirmance implies, recognition of that defense might de-
tract from the deterrent effect of treble damage actions.52 Authorities suggest
48. Id. at § 40.
49. Hanover opinion at 76476.
50. The court might, of course, have meant to refer to Hanover's financial position
immediately after the overcharge. But in that case it would have had to assume, unreason-
ably, that decisions as to dividends and expansion are made instantaneously without con-
sideration of a firm's financial position over a period of time.
51. The defense presumably would be ineffective where plaintiff's increased resale
prices were attributable to an increase in the cost of other factors. Cf. Twin Ports Oil Co.
v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747, 750-51 (8th Cir. 1941) ; Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 969-70 (7th Cir. 1943); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1945).
52. TRAE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) ff 69754 (3d Cir., June 30, 1960). Commen-
tators disagree as to section 4's deterrent effect. Compare, Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010,




that the treble damage remedy serves several functions.53 Certainly, it seeks
to compensate injured plaintiffs. But, while section 4 is not technically a penal
provision," it may be the only effective sanction invoked against an antitrust
violator.5  Where millions of dollars in overcharges are involved, a price fixer
may treat the Sherman Act's $50,000 criminal penalty -6 as simply a cost of
doing business. He may hesitate, however, when faced with a potential three-
fold liability.57 It may be necessary in some cases to forego accurate compen-
sation of injured parties if this deterrent function is to be fully realized. In-
dividual consumers or dealers who sustain the overcharge are unlikely to sue.
Therefore, unless the first purchaser is allowed to recover what may to him
be a windfall, the violator may escape liability altogether.
On the other hand, what little legislative history is available suggests that
the private damage action was originally intended to provide a remedy to the
party ultimately damaged.5 8 In fact, criticism of this remedy in the floor de-
bates centered on the unlikelihood that the consumer-"the party necessarily
damnified or injured"-would ever be in a position to bring suit.5 9
53. See, e.g., United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 581 (1948)
(section 4 provides broad, effective relief for injured parties); Quemos Theatre Co. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, 35 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.N.J. 1940) ("an ancillary force of private
investigators to supplement the Department of Justice in law enforcement"); accord,
Weinberg v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1942) ; Maltz v. Sax, 134
F.2d 2, 4 (7th Cir. 1943). See generally Bicks, supra note 3; HAMILTON & TILL, .supra
note 52, at 82; ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 378-80 (1955).
54. See Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 Fed. 23, 29 (6th Cir.
1903), aff'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) ; Hicks v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 87 F.2d 583,
585 (9th Cir. 1937); United Copper Secs. Corp. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 Fed.
574, 577 (2d Cir. 1916). Contra, Haskell v. Perkins, 28 F.2d 222 (D.N.J. 1928), rev'd on
other grounds, 31 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1929). See generally Void, Are Threefold Damages
Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117 (1939).
55. See Comment, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 130, 138 (1950).
56. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958).
57. See LOEviNGER, op. cit. mtpra note 6, at 254; Comment, 34 VA. L. REv. 901, 902
(1948). The awards have often exceeded one million dollars. Cooper, Treble Damages-
Reward for Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Trust Laws, 32 DICTA 293, 304 (1955).
58. See, 21 CoNG. REc. 1767 (1890) (remarks of Senator George on the private
remedy proposed in section 7 of Senator Sherman's original bill) ; id. at 2615 (remarks
of Senator Coke).
59. See, id. at 3146 (remarks of Senator Regan); id. at 3150 (remarks of Senator
George). When debating the private civil remedy of Senator Sherman's original bill,
Senator George stated:
The right of action against the persons in the combination is given to the party
damnified. Who is this party injured, when, as prescribed in the bill, there has been
an advance in the price by the combination? ... The consumer is the party "damni-
fled or injured."
This is the express provision of the bill, as I think is clear from the last clause
of the first section. But even if it were not the express language of the bill, it so
results as a logical necessity. An advance in price to the middlemen is not mentioned
in the bill for the obvious reason that no such advance would damnify them; it would
rather be a~benefit, as it would increase the value of the goods he has on hand. He
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Admittedly, limitation of the treble damage remedy to plaintiffs who bear
the ultimate loss results in a haphazard disparity of sanctions: If the violator
directly injures widely dispersed, unidentifiable consumers he faces only crim-
inal penalties; but if he injures a consumer or absorbing middleman who has
sustained sufficient damage to warrant litigation, the violator faces both pri-
vate and governmental sanctions. Adoption of the Hanover rule, however,
would only compound, the random nature of the sanction. More violators
would be assessed treble damages under Hanover, but some would still escape
with only the criminal penalty. Treble damage liability would then depend on
whether or not the violator operated through a middleman, or, to be exact,
through a "middleman" middleman as opposed to a "consumer" middleman10
This is scarcely a more rational criterion, even in terms of deterrence; it is
simply more inclusive. Thus the only policy served by the result in Hanover
is that of increasing the deterrent effect of present antitrust law. But if the
level of deterrence absent Hanover is felt to be inadequate, a statutory increase
in criminal sanctions would meet this need more positively, uniformly and
equitably than would the granting of an occasional windfall to a middleman.
Moreover, since the antitrust violations immune from treble damage liability
are those involving economic injury to broad unorganized segments of the
public, criminal sanctions seem a more appropriate way of protecting and
vindicating the interests injured.
Two additional reasons support this conclusion. The existence of the "pass-
ing on" defense will probably have little impact on the overall deterrent effect
of treble damage liability. It is doubtful that an intentional violator will base
his business decisions on the likelihood that customers will pass on the illegal
exactions and that he can prove it at trial. 1 Even if passing on is anticipated,
the entire overcharge may not be passed on. Moreover, the resulting increase
in the customer's price may result in other damage in the form of reduced
volume and profits, for which the violator must respond threefold.6
The second reason lies in the unreasonable burden that rejection of the de-
fense might impose on defendants. Not only would plaintiffs obtain money to
which they were not entitled, but defendants might be forced to sustain lia-
bility in a succession of suits. Unlike the ICC reparation order doctrine, which
buys to sell again. He buys only for profits on a subsequent sale. So whatever he
pays he receives when he sells, together with a profit on his investment; and so of
all of them, including the last, who sells directly to the consumer. The consumer,
therefore, paying all its increased price advanced by the middlemen and profits on
the same, is the party necessarily damnified or injured.
Id. at 1767.
60. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
61. Of course, the prospect of treble damages would have no impact on the inadver-
tent violator. See ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L CommL. ANTITRUST REI'. 378-79 (1955) ; Bicks, ,supra
note 3, at 13. See generally KAYSEN & TURNER, AIms OF ANTITRUST POLIcY 246-47, 257,
271-72 (1959).
62. See, e.g., GRoVEs, FINANCING GOVERNMENT 110-11, 113-14, 121 (4th ed. 1954);
LEFTwIcH, THE PlacE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 152-53 (1955).
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limits recovery to the party in privity with the 6airier, trebie dmage recovery
is not so limited.63 Therefore, if plaintiff in Hanover had sold to a wholesaler
who could prove absorbtion of the overcharge, the wholesaler would also have
a cause of action against United Shoe. Indeed, there is nothing in the Hanover
opinion to preclude recovery by as many consumers or consumer middlemen
as the chain of distribution may contain, so long as each can prove an increase
in costs due to the original overcharge. 64 If the overcharge has injured the
first purchaser despite its subsequent passing on, it will be equally injurious
to the second and the third purchasers.65 Each has a separate injury for which
the violator will be liable. In this case the liability of the initial seller would
be far in excess of anything contemplated by section 4.66
63. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1906);
Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F2d 580, 582-83 (8th Cir. 1945); North-
western Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1943).
64. The violator would not be protected from additional suits by the doctrine of res
judicata. Persons not party nor privy are not bound by the prior determination. REsTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). See generally Developments in the Law-Res .udicata,
65 HARv. L. REV. 818, 855-65 (1952). The fact that other purchasers received their injury
through the medium of the initial plaintiff would not render them privy to the original
judgment. A privy is one whose rights to property occur after the institution of the suit
which affects those rights. The doctrine does not apply to rights acquired before the ad-
judication. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 128-31 (1912) ; National
Lead Co. v. Nulsen, 131 F.2d 51, 56 (8th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 758 (1943) ;
Wise v. United States, 38 F. Supp. 130, 133 (W.D. Ky. 1941) ; California Bridge & Constr.
Co. v. United States, 50 Ct. Cl. 40, 57-60 (1915).
65. Increased use of class actions by injured antitrust plaintiffs makes the threat of
suits by consumers and small retailers more apparent. See Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952); Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1036-37 (1952); Comment,
34 VA. L. REV. 901, 924-25 (1948).
66. Upholding the validity of "passing on" as a defense will not entirely eliminate the
possibility that a violator will be assessed more in damages than his conduct has actually
caused. A passing-on situation raises the likelihood of successive actions by subsequent
purchasers. If the share of overcharge absorbed by each plaintiff is determined in a separate
action, the sum of the parts may be greater than the whole. Also, the cumulative litigation
expenses and harassment involved in defending a series of such suits may be a vexatious
burden in themselves. But in all probability, the prospect of duplicated damages and litiga-
tion expenses will not move a defendant to try to join all the causes in a single action be-
cause to do so would be to stir up remote plaintiffs who may never sue at all.
Nevertheless, defendants might be able to interplead all potential adverse claimants
when they so desire. Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would allow this
form of interpleader, but, since the reach of the district court's process under this rule is
restricted to the territorial limits of the state in which it sits, FED. R. Civ. P. 82; 3 MooRa,
FEDERAL PRAMCc fc . 22.04[2], at 3009-10 (1st ed. 1948), this interpleader would be of
limited value. The jurisdictional limitations of Rule 22 might be avoided by using the
statutory interpleader provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1958), which reads in pertinent
part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of inter-
pleader . . . if (1) two or more adverse claimants of diverse citizenship . . . are
claiming or may claim to be entitled to . . . [the amount in question] . . . and if
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(2) the plaintiff has deposited such... [amount] or has paid the amount ... into
the registry of the court or has given... [the requisite] bond.
(b) Such an action may be entertained although the titles or claims of the conflict-
ing claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical, but are adverse to
and independent of one another.
The diversity requirement might be met under the rule of Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 686
(5th Cir. 1957), which finds diversity if any two of the adverse claimants are of diverse
citizenship. Service of process under § 1335 is nationwide. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1958). Strict-
ly interpreted, a bill of interpleader is only available when the moving party is totally dis-
interested in the fund in question. Where the claims are disputed, a bill in the nature of
interpleader has been permitted when the plaintiff has asserted some other equitable rea-
son for jurisdiction. 3 MOoRE, op. cit. supra, 1 22.03, at 3005-06, f[ 22.071l], at 3019-20.
The deposit requirement of § 1335, however, makes this procedure of dubious advantage,
for seldom will defendants be willing to put up, or able to secure a bond for, the colossal
sums sued for in treble damage actions.
